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THE "RULE OF REASON": WORKABLE COMPETITION
OR WORKABLE MONOPOLY?
WALTER ADAMSt
"Vice is a monster of such frightful mien
That to be hated needs but to be seen,
But seen too oft, familiar with her face
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."
ALEXANDER POPE
As part of the currently fashionable and pervasive revisionism, there have
been numerous attempts to formulate a new approach to the monopoly prob-
lem. Two of these efforts deserve special attention-the report by the Busi-
ness Advisory Council of the Secretary of Commerce 1 and the monumental
study by Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim3 They reach strikingly similar
conclusions and offer parallel recommendations. Both find that recent judicial
interpretation of the antitrust laws has been shifting, vague, confusing, and
uncertain; that a unifying standard 'for judging antitrust violations is impera-
tive; and that such a standard can be achieved through revitalization of the
"Rule of Reason" and acceptance of "Workable Competition." Both studies
concur in Professor Oppenheim's assurance that "the broad discretion dele-
gated by Congress in the Rule of Reason and Workable Competition rule
need not be feared as an erosion of antitrust administration and enforce-
ment."'3 While this may at first blush appear to be old wine in new bottles,
the new approach represents a significant departure in the antitrust field. Its
importance lies in the combination of legal and economic pragmatism into an
instrument for attacking the traditional philosophy of antitrust. It is the
thesis of this article that the new approach is subject to severe limitations,
if not fatal defects; that the interpretation of the Sherman Act is far less
uncertain than its critics imply; that a "Rule of Reason," as these critics use
the phrase, would mean judicial emasculation of Section 1 of the Act ;4 and
tAssociate Professor of Economics, Michigan State College. The author is indebted
to Professor James W. Payne, Jr., of the University of Richmond Law School for help-
ful criticisms and suggestions.
1. BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE COiPETITION (1952) (hereinafter cited as
BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL).
2. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Anti-
trust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139 (1952) (hereinafter cited as OPPENIIEIm).
3. OPPENHEIRM 1196.
4. "Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
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finally, that acceptance of what they mean by "Workable Competition" would
be tantamount to a toleration of monopoly under Section 2
Under Section 1 of the Act, the courts have confronted the problem of
determining whether or not a given business arrangement involved a restric-
tion of competition which was to be conclusively presumed "unreasonable."
Business arrangements which fall into the categories of price fixing, market
sharing,7 or boycotts growing out of joint action among competitors 8 are
subject to this conclusive presumption which makes them illegal per se. Some
commentators have chosen to regard this per se doctrine as part of, and sub-
sumed under, the rule of reason. They have argued that "per se" does not
eliminate the necessity of exercising reasonableness in determining whether
or not a given arrangement fits into a forbidden category.) Other commen-
tators, however, feel that the per se doctrine and the rule of reason are
incompatible; that there is a sharp dichotomy dividing the two; that the per
se doctrine forecloses an examination of the reasonableness (economic desir-
S. "Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty....:
26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1946).
Although all commentators reject the standard of "pure" or "perfect" competition,
there is disagreement as to the nature of the substitute standard--"workable competition."
Some view it as giving "equal emphasis on market structure and market behavior." Ros-
tow & Sachs, Entry into tle Oil Refining Business: 1'ertical Integration Re-examined,
61 YALE L.J. 856, 862 (1952). Others emphasize the performance of the defendants in their
industry. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the Unsitcd States, 62
HAav. L. REv. 1265, 1281-2 (1949). Oppenheim and the Business Advisory Council adopt
the latter view and emphasize the market performance criterion. Althuugh the author
agrees with Professor Rostow, we shall, for purposes of this article, be referring to the
market performance viewpoint when discussing the "workable competition" advocated by
Professor Oppenheim and the Business Advisory Council.
6. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. %. United
States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, k6 U.S.
290 (1897).
7. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; United States v. Imperial Chemicals Industries,
Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
8. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
9. As Professor Handler points out with regard to the Trade Association Cases, the
ultimate question "has been whether it can fairly be said that implicit in the plan is an
agreement or understanding with regard to the price or production policy to be pursued
by the members of the combination, or whether there is an agreement or understanding
otherwise restrictive of competition." HANDLR, A STUDY OF THE Corsmucro AND EN.-
FO'RCE.ENT OF THE ANTI-TRusT LAWs 19 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941). The courts have
not "given much weight to proof that the motives of the members of the combination have
been beneficent, that there has been no sinister purpose or abuse of economic power, ('r
that the objectives of the plan may have been economically justifiable." Aid. Thus dis-
cretion was exercised in determining whether or not a trade association's activity con-
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ability) of a given business arrangement, whereas a genuine rule of reason
should not. Since both Professor Oppenheim and the Business Advisory
Council take the latter view of a rule of reason under Section 1, we shall, for
purposes of this article, accept their definition.
UNCERTAINTY
The Business Advisory Council complains that: "The interpretation and
administration of the Antitrust Laws are so lacking in consistent clear stand-
ards related to practical performance that no businessman can tell whether
or not he is conforming with or violating the spirit and intent of the various
statutes. The businessman's lawyer cannot give reliable guidance."' 0 In en-
dorsing this view, Professor Oppenheim states that "growing uncertainty as
to just where the federal government is headed in its administration and
enforcement of this mass of antitrust laws is casting the shadow of an enor-
mous question mark over many important business decisions which are made
today."" It is this charge of uncertainty which is then made the basis of
demands for legislative revisions. The extent to which the charge is justified
depends on the extent to which the law is, in fact, uncertain.
With respect to price fixing agreements, judicial interpretation of Section
1 has remained surprisingly constant over the years. In the Addyston Pipe
& Steel case, 12 Judge Taft refused to examine the reasonableness of the agree-
ment; he refused to "set sail on a sea of doubt" and to assume the power of
saying "how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how
much is not."' 3 He wisely observed that "the manifest danger in the adminis-
tration of justice according to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard
would seem to be a strong reason against adopting it.'u 4 And, in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States,') the Supreme Court declared that agreements, if
"clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, . . . could not
be taken out of that category by indulging in general reasoning as to the
expediency or non-expediency of having made the contracts or the wisdom
or want of wisdom of the statute which prohibited their being made."'1 Here
was the nucleus of the per se doctrine to which the Business Advisory Coun-
cil and Professor Oppenheim take unqualified exception.
stituted a restraint of trade; but once such a restraint-more than de minimis-was found
to exist, any potential justification thereof on the grounds of reasonableness was fore-
closed. Adoption of the per se doctrine according to Handler, "does not eliminate the
element of discretion. It does, however, establish the metes and bounds of such discretion
and precludes the voyage upon [a] chartless sea of doubt." Id. at 9.
10. BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL 4.
11. OPPENHEIM 1140-1.
12. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
13. Id. at 284.
14. Ibid.
15. 221 U.S. 1 (1911.).
16. Id. at 65.
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This per se doctrine was further crystallized in the Trenton Potteries case.17
There 'Mr. Justice Stone held that every price fixing agreement, if effective,
eliminates one form of competition. He rejected the defense that fixed prices,
if reasonable, cause no injury to the public interest. The ratio decidendi was
unmistakable: the reasonable price of today may become the unreasonable
and arbitrary price of tomorrow. Under Oppenheim's rule of reason, and
in the absence of competition, enforcement agencies would be compelled to
conduct continuous and minute inquiry into the reasonableness of a particular
price; they would have to ascertain from day to day whether an initially
reasonable price had, through the normal change of economic conditions,
become unreasonable. Hence, Justice Stone concluded, "Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreason-
able or unlawful restraints .. ."s He hesitated "to adopt a construction
making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in this field of busi-
ness relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reason-
able--a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete
survey of our economic organization and a choice between rival philoso-
phies.' 9
After a deviation in the Appalachian Coals case,20 the per se doctrine was
again applied in the Socony-Vacuum case. 2 ' There justice Douglas affirmed the
Trenton Potteries doctrine, and in numerous dicta condemned both abortive
and successful, direct and indirect means of tampering with the price struc-
ture through joint action among competitors. Price fixing agreements were
declared to be unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act regardless of
the amount of interstate or foreign commerce involved. "Whatever may
have been the status of price-fixing agreements at common law.., the Sher-
man Act has a broader application to them than the common law prohibitions
or sanctions. . . . Whatever economic justification particular price-fixing
agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an inquiry into
17. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
18. Id. at 397.
19. Id. at 398.
20. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 28S U.S. 344 (1933). Despite Mr.
Justice Douglas' heroic, but unpersuasive, attempt to distinguish rather than overrule the
Appalachian case in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 214 (1940),
few would regard Appalachian as a controlling precedent today. By way of explaining
the Court's deviation from the per se doctrine in this case, it may be relevant to note
that the program in question "concerned itself with efforts to mitigate the hardships of
producers in a hopelessly disorganized and depressed industry during a period of general
depression and . . . that it was submitted to the court before it vas put in operation."
HANDLEP, A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTON AND EN-ForcMnxT OF T11F AxTITInUSr L'wS
33 (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941). It appears doubtful that the identical facts would have
led the Court to the same decision had the case come up at the time of Socony-VacIm,
seven years later.
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22. Id. at 224 n.59.
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their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual or potential
threat to the central nervous system of the economy."
'2 3
Subsequently the per se doctrine was apparently extended to boycotts
growing out of joint action by competitors, 24 and to price fixing agreements
and market sharing arrangements in foreign commerce.25 In view of this
almost monolithic evolution of the case law under Section 1, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to ascertain the respects in which the law is unclear or un-
certain. In fact, it could readily be argued that the trouble with Section 1
is not that it is unclear, but that it has become painfully clear, and that the
hope of prospective price fixers is not to clarify the trend, but to reverse it.
20
Experience justifies a less drastic view of the clamor for clarifying Section
2 of the Act. Here there has been considerable judicial vacillation. In the
earlier cases under Section 2, the courts tended to follow the rule that "size
does not determine guilt; that there must be some 'exclusion' of competitors;
that the growth must be something else than 'natural' or 'normal'; that there
must be a 'wrongful intent,' or some other specific intent; or that some 'un-
duly' coercive means must be used."'27 Since World War II, however, the
courts have tended to emphasize the significance of market power, and to
infer a general intent to monopolize from a course of conduct directed toward
23. Ibid.
24. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
25. See cases cited note 7 supra.
26. This is a paraphrase of Professor Latham's comment on the campaign to "clarify"
the legality of basing point pricing. See Latham, The Politics of Basing Point Legis-
lation, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 272, 273 (1950).
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
This test was applied in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and in
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) ; it was affirmed in United
.States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) ; it was ignored in United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); it was reaffirmed in United States v. International
Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927); and it was diluted in United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ("Mere size . . . is not an offense against the Sherman
Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly. . . , but size carries
with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved
to have been utilized in the past.").
The Reading case was obviously inconsistent with the then prevailing monopoly test,
As Professor Handler points out, "No one can read the Court's opinion [in Reading]
without feeling that what is being forbidden is the combination of giant companies doing
a substantial part of the business in their fields. It matters not that the combination in
no way approaches monopoly control, that it possesses no power to fix prices, or acting
alone, to exclude competitors, that the effects of the combination and intentions of the
defendants are of the best, that the power so obtained is not abused. The important ele-
ment is the elimination of competition between the combining units." Handler, Industrial
Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L. Rzv. 179, 230 (1932). According to Hand-
ler, the Court reached diametrically opposite conclusions in the Reading and U. S. Steel
cases, although the cases are undistinguishable on the facts. He points out that the ma-
jority opinion in Reading bears an unmistakable resemblance to the minority opinion in
U. S. Steel. Id. at 233.
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the achievement, retention, or extension of monopoly power.28 A monopolist
was presumed to have engaged in monopolization unless he could show that
monopoly "was thrust upon" him.20 With increasing clarity there has
emerged the view that Section 2 does not condone good trusts and condemn
bad trusts, but forbids all trusts.30 Under the "new" Sherman Act,3' the
standard applied in Section 2 cases is not whether prices have actually been
raised or competitors actually excluded, but whether power exists, coupled
with an intent and purpose, to raise prices and exclude competitors whenever
it is desired to do so.32 It is this test-the so-called market structure test-
which is coming into sharper focus and which is now the object of growing
criticism. While the test may ultimately be rejected as economically unfeasible
or undesirable, it cannot be attacked as legally unclear.
Yet the alleged unclarity and vagueness of the case law is offered as justi-
fication for the persistent effort to upset the per se doctrine under Section 1,
and the market structure test under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
remedy suggested both by Professor Oppenheim and the Business Advisory
Council is the application of the rule of reason to both sections. As the Busi-
ness Advisory Council put it: "The old Rule of Reason, if applied, would
cure part of the problem, if revived, because it is flexible-but it is also highly
indefinite. Most businessmen and lawyers, even so, prefer the flexibility of
a Rule of Reason, even with its indefiniteness.",3 In a way, this argument
lets the cat out of the bag. Its inconsistency with the demands for greater
clarity and certainty is so obvious, that it is best treated sub silentio.
However, there is another cure for uncertainty which does require com-
ment. The Business Advisory Council suggests that provision be made for
advisory opinions ("authoritative rulings") on activities which may be vari-
ously construed under diverse interpretations of the antitrust laws.3 4 The
businessman, it is said, is quite willing to comply with the law if he can find
out what to comply with. Hence the Council advocates authoritative rulings
as well as special legislation to prevent retroactive impact from any reversal
of position by the Government.3 This procedural change, while it appears
innocent and plausible, is both dangerous and unnecessary. Louis D. Brandeis
emphasized this rather pointedly when he counseled the newly created Federal
Trade Commission not to grant advisory opinions. He argued that it would
28. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United
States v. Aluminum Go. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
29. Id. at 429.
30. Id. at 427.
31. Rostow, The New Shernan Act: A Positive Instruient of Progress, 14 U. oF
Cm. L. Rv. 567 (1947) ; Rostow, Monopoly Undcr the Shcrinan Act: Pawcr or Ptrpose?.,
43 ILm L. REv. 745 (1949).
32. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 3'2 U.S. 781, E09, 811 (1946).
33. Busmiss ADvIsoRY Couxcn. 5.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Ibid.
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be impossible for the FTC to determine in advance whether or not the con-
templated behavior would result in an improper restraint of trade, and that
such a determination would necessitate knowledge of the effect of the con-
templated behavior on competitors who would not be available at the advisory
hearing.,
On the basis of the available evidence, it may not be inappropriate to
suggest that interpretation of the Sherman Act is less vague, unclear, and
confusing than its critics imply; that if, arguendo, the law's enforcement
were indeed vague and shifting, the rule of reason is hardly the appropriate
remedy; and finally, that the advisory opinion suffers from defects which
may vitiate its utility.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE
With respect to Section 1 violations, Professor Oppenheim objects to the
per se doctrine because it selects a particular fact, e.g., price fixing, as estab-
lishing an irrebuttable presumption of antitrust violation without permitting
the respondent to introduce evidence by way of legal or economic justification
for the alleged restraint. Under the Oppenheim proposal, by contrast, the
Government would still have the burden of proving a contract, combination,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade, but such showing would be no more than
a prima facie presumption of unlawful conduct. The respondent would then
be allowed to present rebuttal evidence to show economic and legal justifi-
cations in "harmony with an overriding public interest."' As Professor
Oppenheim puts it: "Throughout the whole course of the proceeding, then,
the respondent would have a full opportunity to present all the relevant facts
36. Testimony of Louis D. Brandeis, FTC RECORDs 2-9 (1915). "Now, I do not
believe, on the other hand, that the difficulty for the businessman is nearly as great as
he imagines it to be. I have been at times counsel for a few trusts. The president of one
of the largest of them, when we were discussing the law some four or five years ago,
and he was full of his attacks against the Sherman Law, said to me, 'Now, you have
been speaking in favor of this Sherman Law, and I have been going around and trying
to find out what I can do, and I can't get any advice as to what I can do.' And he said,
in a rather pleasant enough way, but in certain ways rather sneering, 'Perhaps you can
advise me.' I said, 'I can advise you perfectly, but it is a question of what advice I can
give you. If you ask me how near you can walk to the edge of a precipice without going
over, I can't tell you, for you may walk on the edge, and all of a sudden you may step
on a smooth stone, or strike against a little bit of root sticking out, and you may go over
that precipice. But if you ask me, how near you can go to the precipice and still be safe,
I can tell you, and I can guarantee that whatever mishap comes to you, you will not fall
over that precipice. You have taken my advice, and other lawyers' advice about any
number of things; and when we give you advice, you act on that advice; and you have
given up many a good trade on questions that have had nothing to do with the Sherman
Law, at all, because you were not willing to take the risk.' . . . I said, 'You must not
expect from the Sherman Law any more than you do from any other law you are dealing
with. You must not expect that you can go to the verge of that law without running any
risks." Id. at 12.
37. OPPENEI-M 1157-8.
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he can muster to justify, as an affirmative defense, the merits of his course
of conduct. He would, in short, have a full day in court with the knowledge
that the trier of fact would give due weight to his side of the controversy.
This prima fade case approach appears far more in harmony with due pro-
cess of law than the present reliance upon per se violation rules in proceedings
involving restrictive agreements among competitors.'as To prevent misuse
of his rule of reason as a cloak for subterfuge and evasion of antitrust pro-
hibitions, Professor Oppenheim would place "upon the defendant the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence the legal justifications set up in
his affirmative defense."'39 Thus, while the Government's case would be
judged by the preponderant weight of the evidence, the defendant would have
to meet the more exacting burden of clear and convincing evidence. With
this safeguard, Professor Oppenheim feels that there is little cause to fear an
erosion of effective antitrust enforcement.
It is not unfair to say that this approach would replace our traditional
reliance on competition as a regulator of economic affairs. Under the new
standard, price fixing might be deemed lawful if the prices fixed were reason-
able, i.e., did not injure the public interest. The crucial test would be per-
formance; "good" social ends would justify hitherto anti-social means. Or,
to put it in the classic parlance of pragmatic realism: as long as the trains
are on time, the method of determining schedules is of secondary importance.
It is significant that nowhere does Professor Oppenheim spell out the types
of defenses to be admitted by way of rebutting a prima facie presumption of
unlawful conduct. Yet, judging by the justifications offered in previous price
fixing cases, we have some notion of what the leading defenses are likely to
be. In the past, the affirmative defenses included the contention that (1) the
industry is peculiarly vulnerable to ruinous competition; (2) the prices fixed
are reasonable; (3) depressed conditions in the industry make a restraint on
price competition imperative; and (4) the price fixing arrangement is innocu-
ous since it lacks the power to set prices. An examination of each of these
defenses may throw some light on the efficacy of the "new approach."
Ruinous Competition
This defense contends that unrestrained price competition, while generally
desirable, is unworkable in the industry in question. Thus, in the Trans-
Missouri case4-0 defendants claimed that "competition while, perhaps, right
and proper in other business, simply leads in railroad business to financial
ruin and insolvency." 4' In the railroad industry, with its heavy capital in-
vestments and decreasing costs per unit, each road must attract additional
freight in order to increase revenues. Since other roads are similarly moti-
38. Id. at 1159.
39. Id. at 1160.
40. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
41. Id. at 330.
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vated, any price cut will meet with inevitable retaliation-to the detriment of
all. "The only refuge, it is said, from this wretched end lies in the power of
competing roads agreeing among themselves to keep up prices for transporta-
tion to such sums as shall be reasonable in themselves, so that companies
may be allowed to save themselves from themselves, and to agree not to attack
each other, but to keep up reasonable and living rates for the services per-
formed."
42
Similar claims have been made for other industries. A former trustee of
the Cement Institute, for example, in defending the collusive basing point
system, once wrote that cement was an industry "above all others that cannot
stand free competition, that must systematically restrain competition or be
ruined. '43 These examples can be multiplied. All raise the central issue
whether exemptions from the antitrust laws should lie in the discretion of the
courts, or in the legislative domain of Congress. Certainly, past experience
indicates that Congress has granted exemptions without reluctance wherever
it thought that a particular situation or the conditions of a particular industry
justified such action.44 It would seem that in a democracy it is for the elected
representatives of the people and not for private groups (subject to judicial
veto) to decide whether or not a particular industry is capable of withstand-
ing the rigors of competitive rivalry.
Reasonable Prices
In every price fixing case, there is inevitably offered the defense that the
prices fixed are reasonable. 45 This raises the fundamental and difficult prob-
lem of selecting a proper standard of reasonableness, i.e., a standard suitable
for judicial application. 46 Assuming that a proper standard for judging the
42. Id. at 331.
43. Quoted in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948).
44. Congress has expressly exempted certain specific activities from the Sherman Act.
See, e.g., § 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946) (labor
organizations) ; the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 STAT. 517 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §62 (1946)
(foreign trade associations); the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C.
§ 291 (1946) (farm cooperatives); the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 198
(1933) (codes of fair competition); the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1946) (resale price maintenance); the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 STAT.
34 (1945), as amended, 61 STAT. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (Supp. 1952) (insurance
companies) ; the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 62 STAT. 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b (Supp. 1952)
(railroad rate agreements).
45. See cases cited note 6 supra.
46. The difficulty of finding such a standard in a case involving railroad rates was
described by Mr. Justice Peckham:
"Must the rate be so high as to enable the return for the whole business done to
amount to a sum sufficient to afford the shareholder a fair and reasonable profit upon his
investment? If so, what is a fair and reasonable profit? That depends sometimes upon the
risk incurred, and the rate itself differs in different localities: which is the one to which
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reasonableness of prices can be found, it is at best doubtful whether the courts
can provide that detailed and continuous supervision over prices which, in
the absence of competition, would be imperative.4 7 Moreover, it is question-
able whether a court should, in effect, be converted into an administrative
agency guarding the public against potential exploitation.
The basic policy question is this: shall the businessman be permitted to
forsake competition and engage in price fixing and other trade restraints
while simultaneously avoiding effective regulation in the public interest? Can
the public be expected to rely on industry self-government,"3 enlightened
stewardship, or benevolent economic despotism as desirable alternatives to a
free market? Competition is only one technique of social control; one method
for limiting the power of individual firms over the economy. If competition
is to be abandoned, an adequate safeguard must be put in its place. The
price fixer's fear of potential rebuke by the courts does not appear to be such
a safeguard.
Depressed Condition of the Industry
This defense was most forcefully and persuasively presented in the
Appalachian Coals case of 1933.9 Given the depressed condition of the coal
industry, it was argued that a joint selling agency covering 73 percent of the
producers in the Appalachian field w-as a reasonable restraint of trade. There
was little question about the extent of the industry's distress. Coal was a sick
industry which, under the influence of World War I expansion, had built up
reference is to be made as the standard? Or is the reasonableness of the profit to be
limited to a fair return upon the capital that would have been sufficient to build and equip
the road, if honestly expended? Or is still another standard to be created, and the reason-
ableness of the charges tried by the cost of the carriage of the article and a reasonable
profit allowed on that? And in such case would contribution to a sinking fund to make
repairs upon the roadbed and renewal of cars, etc., be assumed as a proper item? Or is
the reasonableness of the charge to be tested by reference to the charges for the trans-
portation of the same kind of property made by other roads similarly situated? If the
latter, a combination among such roads as to rates would, of course, furnish no means
of answering the question." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
331-2 (1S97).
47. On the inability of the courts to evaluate complex economic data, see Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1949).
48. In describing one American experiment with industry self-government, Professor
Kreps observed: "[Tihe point must be made emphatic that the NRA was a device con-
ceived by business, put into effect by business, administered by businessmen, and finally,
in the Schechter decision of May, 1935, demolished by the Supreme Court on the instance
of businessmen." KaR~s, BuSINEss AND GOVERNMENT UNDER THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
REcovERY Act 18-19 (1936).
49. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 2S U.S. 344 (1933). For a discussion
of the public policy alternatives in the coal industry, see Rostow, Bituninous Coal and
the Public Interest, 50 YALEn L.J. 543 (1941) ; Hamilton, Coal and the Economy-A De-
nzfrrcr, 50 YALE L.J. 595 (1941) ; Miller, The Pricing of Bituminous Coal: Some Inter-
national Comparisons, 1 PUBLIC POLICY 144 (1940).
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a capacity exceeding 700,000,000 tons to meet an annual demand of less than
500,000,000 tons. Under the impact of the depression of the early 1930's, the
bottom had dropped out of the coal market, thus aggravating the long-run
decline of coal relative to oil, natural gas, and other fuels. That the problem
was further compounded by the increased efficiency of coal in industrial uses
and by the existence of concentrated power on the buying side of the market
was readily conceded. 50 The question nevertheless remained whether or not
the deplorable condition of the industry made the restraint on price competi-
tion a reasonable restraint.
The coal industry in 1933 was, of course, a classic milieu for the "depressed
industry" argument.5 ' Yet it is debatable whether, even in this case, the re-
straint could be justified by sound economic principles. To the extent that
coal's afflictions were attributable to the business cycle, the pricing arrange-
ment in question was hardly a suitable remedy. Depressions can be attacked
most effectively with countercyclical monetary and fiscal weapons which strike
at the root of the difficulty; they cannot be cured by price fixing schemes.6
2
Moreover, overexpansion of capacity cannot be undone even by collusive de-
vices. European cartels, for example, have repeatedly tried to eliminate war-
born over-capacity only to find that their artificial restraints tended to per-
petuate such capacity, and intensify competition from non-members and sub-
stitute products. 3 Furthermore, the effort to maintain or raise prices arti-
ficially is not likely to arrest the long-run decline of one industry relative to
competing industries. To the extent that such price manipulations are suc-
cessful, they tend to accelerate, not arrest, the decline of a depressed in-
dustry. Finally, concentration of power on the buying side of the market does
50. In appraising the evidence in the case, the district court found that defendants'
plan was "an attempt to organize the coal industry and to relieve the deplorable con-
ditions resulting from overexpansion, destructive competition, wasteful trade practices,
and the inroads of competing industries." 1 F. Supp. 339, 341 (W.D. Va. 1932). The
district court, however, rejected this justification of the pricing arrangement, and held
same to be a violation of Section 1.
51. The "depressed industry" argument was also attempted in the Socony-Vacuun
case, where defendants urged the necessity of removing "distress" gasoline from the
market in order to save the industry from itself. Defendants argued "that they had
affected prices only in the sense that the removal of the competitive evil of distress gaso-
line by the buying programs had permitted prices to rise to a normal competitive level;
that their activities promoted rather than impaired fair competitive opportunities; and
therefore that their activities had not unduly or unreasonably restrained trade." 310 U.S.
150, 211-12 (1940).
52. See Boulding, In Defense of Monopoly, 59 Q.J. EcoN. 524 (1945).
53. See STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS IN AcTIo N c. 3 (1950). Excess capacity,
resulting from over-expansion, does not disappear through cartelization. If the cartel
allocates the limited demand to its membership through output quotas, or if the cartel
attempts to maintain artificial prices (thus curtailing consumption), existing facilities
will not be fully used. This unused capacity represents a cost for which someone-in this
case, the consumer-has to pay. Here, as in other areas of economic life, "there is no
such thing as a free lunch."
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not justify the promotion of countervailing power on the selling side. An
alternative solution, equally logical and more consistent with the competitive
philosophy, would be to dispel the source of original market power. In short,
the depressed condition of an industry certainly may call for some remedial
action; but it is questionable whether unsupervised private action, involving
significant departures from competition, constitutes the most fruitful and least
dangerous method of attack. 4
Lack of Market Power
In the Appalachian Coals case defendants argued that only 73 percent of
the field's production was covered by the agreement; that Appalachian coal
had to compete with that of other regions; that entry into the industry
(potential competition) was unfettered; and that defendants' concerted action
might incidentally "affect" market price, but could not set it.05 Similarly, in
the Socony-Vacuum case, defendants urged that their purchase program for
"distress" gasoline had no "effect on the competitive market price beyond
that flowing from the removal of a competitive evil; and that if [they] had
tried to do more than free competition from the effect of distress gasoline and
to set an arbitrary non-competitive price through their purchases, they would
have been without power to do so."' ;0
Assuming these contentions to be valid, it would still be true that attempts
to raise, lower, or stabilize prices through joint action of competitors involve
a direct interference and tampering with the free play of market forces. Even
though a particular price fixing agreement may fall short of power to con-
trol or dominate a given market, it still has an influence on market price and
may be of considerable value to the conspirators; else they would not, as
rational businessmen, adhere to it. Moreover, even a monopolist lacks power
-in any absolute sense-to control market price, because he is limited by
the competition of substitute products and the fear of potential competition.0
T
Finally, it is to be noted that price fixing is distinct from monopolizing, and
that the Sherman Act condemns the former as well as the latter. "The exist-
54. A contrary opinion was expressed by Chief Justice Hughes in the Appjlacidan
Coals case: "Voluntary action to rescue and preserve [fair competitive] opportunities,
and thus to aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving commerce by placing
competition on a sounder basis, may be more efficacious than an attempt to provide
remedies through legal processes." 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933).
55. "The contention is, and the court below found, that while defendants could not
fix market prices, the concerted action would 'affect' them, that is, that it would J:aue a
tendency to stabilize ,narket prices and to raise them to a higher level thatn would other-
-wse obtain." 28 U.S. 344, 373 (1933) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court then
went on to justify this effect on prices by holding that no "effect will be preduced which
in the circumstances of this industry will be detrinwntal to fair competition!" Ibid. (em-
phasis added).
56. 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940) (emphasis added).
57. See pages 3624 infra.
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ence or exertion of power to accomplish the desired objective . . . becomes
important only in cases where the offense charged is the actual monopolizing
of any part of the trade or commerce in violation of § 2 of the Act ...
An intent and a power to produce the result which the law condemns are
then necessary. . . . But the crime under § 1 is legally distinct from that
under § 2. . . . Only a confusion between the nature of the offenses under
those two sections ... would lead to the conclusion that power to fix prices
was necessary for proof of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1.'"58 In short,
the lack of monopoly power is hardly an adequate defense to a charge of price
fixing.
Focusing on the abuses arising from trade restraints, rather than on the
restraints themselves, would permit the wholesale cartelization of American
industry, provided only that cartel power remained unabused. A comparison
of the Oppenheim proposal with the German cartel law of 192350 is enlighten-
ing. That law provided that if a contract or resolution covering production
or marketing policy, or prescribing conditions of trading or methods of fix-
ing prices, should endanger the national economy or the public interest, the
Reich Minister of Economic Affairs could "apply to the Cartel Court for a
58. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 1SO, 226 n.59 (1940).
59. For a complete text of "Ordinance against the Misuse of Economic Power,
Promulgated 2nd November, 1923," see LiEFMANN, CARTELS, CONCERNS AND TRUSTS 351
et seq. (1932). In fairness to Oppenheim it must be said that he regards cartel-like
agreements among competitors as alien to his personal philosophy. Oppenheim states that,
in making his proposal, he has no intention "to give aid to any mechanisms fostering
erosion of the basic concept of Workable Competition .... The writer's plea for a full-
scale application of the Rule of Reason in the types of situations here under discussion
is not to be taken as an invitation to return to the roseate hues of industrial self-regulation
through joint agreements among trade association members or other groups of competitors
as advocated in the 1920's and as they flourished in the NRA Codes of Fair Competition
during the brief life of the National Industrial Recovery Act." O'rzNsImx, 1160.
For an incisive comment on the rule of reason approach in the British Monopolies
and Restrictive Practices Act (1948), see Rostow, Britain and Monopolies: An Avcrican
View, Manchester Guardian, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 4, cols. 6-7, et scq. In contrasting the
British law with the traditional American antitrust philosophy, Rostow observes: "Both
the British and the American legislation agree that economic situations in which com-
petition is restricted, either by reason of the relative size of business units within a given
market or because of collusive arrangements among a number of relatively smaller firms,
present a problem in the public interest. Both Congress and Parliament recognize that
such power in a market may be abused, to the detriment of the economy. The American
approach is to attack the existence of the power, on the ground that no court or adminis-
trative body can maintain a constant review of all sectors of the economy, in order to
ascertain whether economic power which is being beneficently used today will also be
beneficently used tomorrow. . . . The new British law appears to accept the opposite
premise-that there can be 'good' as well as 'bad' monopolies, and that the public interest
will be served by holding monopolies to appropriate standards of behavior with regard
to the level of their profits, restrictions on the entry of new firms, exclusive dealerships,
discount practices, the control of resale prices, limitations on access to information, and
the like." Id. at p. 4, col. 7.
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declaration that the contract or resolution is null and void, or for an injunc-
tion restraining the particular application of it."' O The national economy or
the public interest were to be held endangered "where production or supply
is restricted or prices raised or kept up... to an extent which is econumically
unjustifiable, or where economic freedom is restricted by means of buyers'
or sellers' boycotts or inequitably affected by the fixing of differential prices
and conditions of sale."'61 While the procedural details are different, 2 this
cartel statute has an uncomfortable resemblance to the proposal here under
consideration. But perhaps we are no more than reasoning by analogy.
"Cartel" is not-as Justice Frankfurter rightly points out-a talismanic
word.63 Yet "cartel" does connote an absence or curtailment of competition,
and competition is what the antitrust laws are designed to preserve. Unless
we are to anticipate the "double-think" standards of 1984, we shall have to
continue regarding price fixing as price fixing.04
MONOPOLY
With regard to Section 2 violations, Professor Oppenheim observes that
current debates over enforcing the law against monopoly bigness are merely
symptomatic of "the underlying problem of discovering what is good bigness
and what is bad bigness."65 He decries excessive reliance on the market
structure standard under which oligopoly is often regarded as tacit group
monopoly, and oligopoly conduct is considered equivalent to restrictive agree-
ments among competitors, in the absence of proof of actual collusion. "In the
process, the accomplishments of the oligopoly industry are given little or no
weight at all."66
For this reason both Professor Oppenheim and the Business Advisory
Council suggest a new interpretation of Section 2 which would place primary
60. LIFMANN, CARrELS, Co Ncmxs AND TRusTs 351 (1932).
61. Id. at 352. To advocates of the "new" approach, this provision may prove dis-
turbing because of the "'per se" overtones and the Robinson-Patman type prohibitions
implicit therein.
62. The main difference would appear to be in the allocation of the burden of proof.
While the cartel statute places the entire burden on the government, Professor Oppan-
helm's "rule of reason" would require dclendant to rebut a prima facie presumption with
cear and convincing evidence of legal or economic justifications.
63. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951).
64. "Legal rules calling for price competition contain suund economic insight or
intuition. More recent decisions which affirm and strengthen them may not be disnisnect
summarily on economic grounds by vague references to newer notions ,f competition. If
it had become necessary for courts to distinguish good cartels from bad cartels, or just
prices from unjust prices, or to distinguish offsetting innovation advantages in deternmin-
ing the legality of price fixing arrangements, antitrust laws would probably have becvme
unenforceable or have been converted to instruments for increasing business regimenta-
tion." Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. OF PA. L Rxv. 577, 630 (1953).
65. OPFNHEIM 1191.
66. Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
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emphasis not on market structure but on market performance.07 Good mo-
nopolies would be distinguished from bad monopolies, hinging the difference
between the two on the performance test of workable competition. Despite
the statutory language which prohibits all monopolizing,08 Professor Oppen-
heim would condemn only those market organizations which are both mo-
nopolistic and injurious to the public interest. He apparently adopts the fol-
lowing criteria for judging performance in the public interest: "(1) Alter-
natives available to customers or sellers; (2) Volume of production or ser-
vices; (3) Quality of the services or goods; (4) Number of people benefited;
(5) Incentives to entrepreneurs; (6) Efficiency and economy in manufac-
turing or distribution; (7) The welfare of employees; (8) The tendency
to progress in technical development; (9) Prices to customers; (10) Condi-
tions favorable to the public interest in defending the country from aggression;
(11) The tendency to conserve the country's natural resources; (12) Bene-
fits to the public interest assuming the relief requested by the government
in the proceedings."0' 9 This approach to the monopoly problem is subject to
rather severe limitations.
The Snare and Delusion of Workable Competition
Workable competition overemphasizes the significance of inter-industry,
inter-product, and technological competition. The Business Advisory Coun-
cil, in illustrating the operation of workable competition, observes that alu-
minum "must compete with steel, copper, zinc, lead, tin, wood, textiles, plas-
tics, paper, clay, glass, leather and cork. . . .Timber, the ancient material,
has been rejuvenated through modern chemistry. The textile industry has
been revolutionized both by chemistry and by technical machinery. The for-
mer transport dominance of the railroad industry has long been lost to high-
way and air competition. Such examples could be multiplied."7 0 To the
67. While Professor Oppenheim concedes the necessity of weighing "all of the rele-
vant economic factors bearing upon the interaction of structure, behavior, and accomplish-
ments in the particular case," OPPENHEim 1190, it is apparent that accomplishments (per-
formance) occupy a central and dominant position in his trinity of standards.
The Business Advisory Council defines the rule of reason almost exclusively in terms
of performance. BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL 17.
68. See note 5 supra.
69. Smith, Effective Competition : Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws,
26 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 405 (1951), quoted in OPPENHEIM 1188. While Professor Oppen-
heim tentatively endorses these tandards, he suggests that different standards may be
equally acceptable if formulated by the national committee on the antitrust laws proposed
in his article. Ibid.
These criteria are substantially the same as those recommended in BUSINESS AvIsoRYn
COUNCIL 17. The only difference between the two versions is that the Business Advisory
Council replaces the "welfare of employees" standard with "conditions favorable to the
public interest in maintaining American investments abroad."
70. BUSINEss ADVISORY COUNCIL 14.
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Council this is proof of workable competition-or what it calls effective com-
petition-in action. This it regards as preferable to the abstract and un-
realistic "perfect" competition of classical economic theory as a standard for
applied public policy.
7'1
Three observations are relevant on this score. First, as Henry Simons has
pointed out, "no sane advocate is asking for perfect competition, and no critic
who is at once fair and competent will picture the [antitrust] policy as re-
quiring drastic change in the organization of production. The requisite changes
have to do mainly with ownership units and control devices not with opera-
tion." 72 Antitrust supporters do not demand that the economy be purified
right out of the twentieth century.73 They do suggest, however, that in most
industries competition can be increased without diminution of technological
efficiency.
Secondly, inter-industry competition as an economic force is more apparent
than real. The fact is that when the paper container posed a threat to the
tin can duopoly, Continental Can entered the paper container industry; when
magnesium challenged the aluminum monopoly, Alcoa joined the magnesium
cartel; when aluminum became a substitute for copper, Anaconda embarked
on its venture into the aluminum industry.74 Today railroads control bus lines,
shipping companies are tied to airlines, newspapers control radio stations,
and TV outlets are operated by licensees of AM stations. Most serious, per-
haps, is the Government's official blessing of important mergers in the com-
munications industry, such as the recent combination of motion picture and
television holdings.7 Besides being only a limited substitute for intra-indus-
try rivalry, inter-industry competition can be manifestly subverted by control
on the highest level of intercorporate finance.
71. Id. at 8.
72. SI OS, EcoNOMIc PoLcY FOR A FREa Socwr- 82 (1948).
73. See Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 Hnv. L. REv. 28, 35 (1953).
74. See Adams, Conipetition, Monopo', and Countcr'ailing Powe-r, 67 Q.J. Ecu:.
469 (1953).
75. In her dissenting opinion, FCC Commissioner Hennock pointed out:
"In such a situation there is a substantial risk that the merged company,
through the medium of ... restrictive practices, may subordinate its tele-
vision interests to its motion picture exhibition interests, particularly so when
the company's greater investments in theatres may be in an especially vul-
nerable or precarious position.
"Given the opportunity for economic gain through such restrictive prac-
tices, and in the absence of adequate safeguards against them, it cannot be
assumed that the merged company will push its motion picture theatre and
television interests fully and independently of each other, or to anywhere
near the same extent that completely unfettered business competitors nor-
mally would."
American Broadcasting Co. and United Paramount Theatres, Inc., FCC Dkt. 10046,
8 PiKE & FIscHER, RA.Io REG. SERv. 541, 631(23) (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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Thirdly, inter-industry competition is perfectly compatible with a fully
monopolized economy. Even if the aluminum, copper, steel, and magnesium
industries were each a 100 percent monopoly, they could still theoretically
compete with each other. Moreover, such competition might well qualify as
"effective" under the standards of the Business Advisory Council, for there
vould still be "unhampered business incentives and freedom of choice, with
reasonable alternatives for buyers and sellers."70 The incentives, to be sure,
would exist for the few and not the many; the alternatives would be those
which the respective monopolists, in their role as industrial stewards, made
available to the fortunate beneficiaries of modern technology.
Workable Competition and Effective Antitrust Enforcement
Workable competition tends to obliterate any practical guidelines to effec-
tive antitrust enforcement. It fails to indicate how much competition is re-
quired to satisfy its pragmatic demands. All we are told is that there must
be enough competition to provide reasonable alternatives. "When consumers
can choose freely between alternative sellers, each seller has an incentive to
improve his product and lower his price. Consumers are thereby protected
against monopolistic exploitation.
'77
This is hardly a clear, definite, or measurable standard.78 Obviously, there
will always be some competition and some freedom of choice under almost
any form of economic organization.7" The history of cartels, for example,
is replete with instances where cartel policy was undermined by ungentle-
manly insiders or uncooperative outsiders. Even a tightly organized com-
bination like the international oil cartel was continually plagued by periodic
outbreaks of competition.80 The rubber cartel found that restrictive produc-
76. BusiNzEss ADviSORY COUNCIL 8.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Dean Mason, probably the most sophisticated economist to advocate workable
competition, concedes that a judicial evaluation of "performance" or "accomplishments"
involves considerable difficulty. In testing adequate business performance, according to
Mason, "it would have to be said that although it is probably possible to arrive at in-
formed judgments, it is extremely difficult to devise tests that can be administered by a
court of law .... No one familiar with the statistical and other material pertaining to
the business performance of firms and industries would deny the extreme difficulty of
constructing from this material a watertight case for or against the performance of par-
ticular firms in particular industries." Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Prob.
lens in. the United States, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1281, 1282 (1949). There is considerable
attraction in Mason's suggestion that performance be given some weight by the enforce-
ment agencies in selecting cases for prosecution. Id. at 1284. Given their meager appro-
priations, these agencies have-of necessity-enormous discretion over the kinds of cases
and the business areas in which to bring them.
79. Professor Chamberlin, a long time ago, pointed out that just as there is no "ier-
fect competition," so there is no "pure monopoly." CHAMBERLIN, THIE THEORY OF MO-
NOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1st ed. 1933).
80. FTC, THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL (1952).
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tion quotas on the large plantations would be more than offset by the in-
creased output of small, non-member producers.8 ' Similiarly, under the
NRA, enforcement of code prices and quotas was more easily conceived
in theory than achieved in practice. Despite the rather severe penalties for
violation of the codes of "fair competition," there -was a considerable number
of "unethical chiselers" who rendered them unworkable. Finally, even in an
industry which is completely monopolized there is still room for rather sharp
intra-firm competition between the operating divisions of the monopoly.
The question remains therefore: how much competition must there be to
qualify an industry as "workably competitive," or how much monopoly must
be shown before antitrust action is justified? The workable competition
advocates do not provide an answer. Nowhere do they cite a specific example
of an American industry which is too monopolistic to be considered workably
competitive. This is an ominous sign for the employment outlook in the
market for antitrust lawyers.
Workable Competition-a Cornucopia of Escape Hatches
Before the courts could decree a violation of Section 2 under the standard
of workable competition, there would have to be proof that defendants pos-
sessed monopoly power, and that defendants' course of conduct was incon-
sistent with such tests of market performance as conservation of resources,
employee welfare, promotion of foreign investment, maintenance of entre-
preneurial incentives, and conditions favorable to national defense. As if the
specifically enumerated tests of "good" performance (public interest) did not
offer enough loopholes, the Business Advisory Council reminds us that these
tests are "relevant, but not exclusive."' s -2 We thus have the implicit assurance
that should these performance standards fail to offer a sufficiently broad
spectrum of defenses, others might be added to accommodate worthy de-
fendants.
This almost preclusive reliance on market performance in judging the work-
ability of competition raises at least two vexing problems. First, assuming
that market performance in a particular industry is "good," the really signi-
ficant question remains unanswered: have these favorable market results
"been compelled by the system-by competition--or do they represent simply
the dispensations of managements which, with a wide latitude of policy choices
at their disposal, happened for the moment to be benevolent or 'smart'F?"8s
In other words, are there checks, balances, and incentives inherent in work-
able competition which offer reasonable assurance that the vorkable com-
petition of today will not become the abusive monopoly or oppressive con-
spiracy of tomorrow? Secondly, what evidence is there that "those predatory
or collusive actions which the law [now] attacks are indeed requisite to a
81. STocKNa & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 53, c. 3.
82. BusiNF-ss ADvisoRY Couucn. 17.
83. Lewis, Snymposiun on the Antitrust Laws, 39 Am. Eco. RE%. 703, 707 (1949).
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good performance."8 4 Is there not a post hoc ergo propter hoc aspect to the
contention that where performance of an industry is "good," this is due to
conduct in violation of the antitrust laws? As Professor Kahn points out,
the burden of proof in this respect rests with the advocates of workable com-
petition. To date, they have not shouldered the risk of non-persuasion with
any degree of success.
Market Structure under Workable Competition
The workable competition standard, in its preoccupation with market per-
formance, tends to ignore some crucial implications of market structure. In
fact, workable competition assumes in part that, if monopolistic abuses and
predatory practices can be controlled, an industry's market structure is of
secondary importance. Thus the advocates of workable competition would
generally agree with Justice McKenna's dictum that "the law does not make
mere size an offense or the existence of unexerted power an offense."'88 They
would disagree with Professor Stigler's generalization that "an industry
which does not have a competitive structure will not have competitive be-
havior."6
This aspect of workable competition-the "abuse" theory of size-is open
to several major criticisms. In industries showing a structural deviation from
the competitive norm, an attack on monopolistic practices can be likened to
a treatment of the symptoms while ignoring the disease. The history of the
United Shoe Machinery Corporation is a case in point. After an unsuccess-
ful dissolution suit,8 7 the courts perpetually enjoined the company's use of
the tying contract.8 8 It was hoped at the time that this prohibition would
remove the primary means of lessening competition and creating monopoly.
This turned out to be a vain hope, however, for the company substituted
other provisions in its leasing contracts to achieve the same unlawful ends.80
Finding the highway to restraint of trade blocked, the monopolist simply
traveled cross-country. As a result, 25 years after the injunction decree, the
Antitrust Division felt compelled to attack the industry's monopolistic struc-
ture, in order to deal effectively with its monopolistic practices.
Moreover, the "abuse" theory of size ignores the economic realities of inter-
corporate relationships.00 Once a firm has attained a dominant position in
84. Kahn, supra note 73, at 41.
85. United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
86. The Case Against Big Bushiess, Fortune, May, 1952, pp. 123, 167.
87. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
88. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922) (under § 3
of the Clayton Act).
89. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass,
1953).
90. "Domination may spring as readily from subtle or unexercised power as from
arbitrary imposition or command. To conclude otherwise is to ignore the -realties of inter-
corporate relationships." North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946).
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the market place, it no longer has to engage in predatory practices to achieve
its monopolistic ends. Its mere existence will be sufficient warning to smaller
rivals that non-cooperation may be equivalent to suicide.01
Finally, it appears almost impossible to change oligopolistic market be-
havior without a transformation of oligopolistic market structure. This was
dramatically indicated by defense counsel in the Tobacco case of 1946,2 who
observed that the Court's decision left the companies "entirely without guide
as to how they may lawfully avoid the creation of evidence of future Sher-
man Act violations against themselves, unless they cease business alto-
gether."93 With justifiable consternation, counsel queried: "What are the
specific policies and practices we must abandon, modify, or adopt in order
to conduct our business according to law? ... Is everything the appellants
do illegal, or evidence of illegality, if done by more than one of them?"
Neither the prosecution nor the courts provided an answer.05 The Tobacco
case and similar prosecutions indicate the futility of condemning rational
91. "For the essense of restraint is power; and power may arise merely out of posi-
tion. Whenever a dominant position has been attained, restraint necessarily arises."
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921) (dissenting
opinion).
Thomas Nixon Carver rejected the "abuse" theory in non-legal, but picturesque, lan-
guage:
"If I may use a homely illustration, I will take the common house cat, whose diminu-
tive size makes her a safe inmate of our household in spite of her playful disposition and
her liking for animal food. If, without the slightest change of character or disposition,
she were suddenly enlarged to the dimensions of a tiger, we should at least vant her
to be muzzled and to have her claws trimmed, whereas if she were to assume the dimen-
sions of a mastodon, I doubt if any of us would want to live in the same house with her.
And it would be useless to argue that her nature had not changed, that she was just as
amiable as ever, and no more carnivorous than she alv.ays had been. Nor would it con-
vince us to be told that her productivity had greatly increased and that sie could now
catch more mice in a minute than she formerly could in a week. We should be afraid lest,
in a playful mood, she might set a paw upon us, to the detriment of our epidermis, or that
in her large-scale mouse-catching she might not always discriminate between us and the
mice." CARvFR, EssAYs I.T SocLAL JusTIcE 332 (1915).
92. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
93. Quoted in NIcHoLLs, PRIcE POLICIES IN THE CIoA.EmrE INDusTRm 401 (1951).
94. Quoted id. at 402.
95. As a matter of pure logic it may, of course, be argued that there is more than one
line of business conduct open to an oligopolist, and that the "collusive" behavior implicit
in an oligopolistic market structure is by no means inevitable or inexorable. Dexter Keezer,
Vice-President of the McGraw-Hill Book Company, for extample, points out that as few
as two firms may be enough theoretically to provide effective competition in an industry:
"If the heads of the two surviving firms were the hard-driving, fiercely indeftendent type
of businessman who has played such a large part in the industrial development of the
U.S.A., two of them would be enough to create a ruggedly competitive situation. But
if the two were of the genteel, clubby and inclined-to-take-it-easy type which is also aiown
in the high reaches of American business, two companies might get tc-gether and tend toj
sleep together indefinitely. When the number of firms involved is small, the chances of
having the industry animated by vigorously competitive leadership also seems to me to
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oligopoly behavior without an attempt to change the market structure which
makes the condemned behavior almost inevitable. 0
The Vulnerable Basic Premise of Workable Competition
Workable competition rests on the unsubstantiated assumption that the
present pattern of industrial concentration is an essential condition for effi-
ciency and progress. According to the Business Advisory Council, "a big
economy requires big industry. Without big enterprises, many constantly
improved products cannot be turned out in the great quantities at the low
prices that we Americans have come to expect-and demand."0 7 In a similar
vein, Professor Oppenheim observes that "the real question is what form
and degree of price competition can be realistically expected under specified
conditions of imperfect competition."9 As if the necessity of giant size had
been scientifically established, the search is launched for a compatible degree
of monopoly power rather than for a market structure which can yield more
competition within the limits of modern technology. 9
To the writer's knowledge, no scientific study has yet demonstrated that
giant size is imperative for the optimum utilization of modern technology or
the attainment of efficiency in mass production industries. Indeed, some of the
recent evidence has tended to point in the opposite direction.' 00 Fragmentary,
as it is, this evidence indicates, for example, that the giant U. S. Steel Cor-
poration is no paragon of efficiency. A report prepared at the request of LI. S.
Steel itself pictured the corporation "as a big sprawling inert giant, whose
production operations were improperly coordinated; suffering from a lack of
be relatively small." Keezer, Symposimn on the Antitrust Laws, 39 Am. EcoN. Rrv. 703,
718 (1949).
For an incisive analysis of the behavioral consequences of an oligopolistic market struc-
ture, see Kaysen, Collusion under the Shemnan Act, 65 Q.J. EcoN. 263 (1951).
96. Obviously, "no one can be forced to behave as if he possessed less intelligence
than he really does. Specific manifestations of oligopolistic co-ordination can be suppressed.
But in each case where this is done, it is necessary to ask the question as to what other
manifestations of oligopolistic co-ordination are likely to show if certain business policies
are outlawed .... Unless the basic characteristics of the market structure itself are changed,
the objectionable market results will be promptly replaced by different but equally oligopo-
listic results." Fellner, Collusion and its Limits under Oligopoly, 40 Am. EcoN. REV. SuPP.
55, 58-9 (1950).
97. Busixcss ADvisoRY COUNCIL 3.
98. OPPENHEIm 1191. (emphasis added).
99. The real problem is not "how much monopoly can safely be tolerated. The more
important question is whether the entire community would be better off with more com-
petition than now exists." Bowman, supra note 64, at 640-1. Bowman goes on to suggest
that proof of monopoly should be rebuttable only by a showing that defendant had mo-
nopoly "thrust upon it," i.e., a showing that the economies of scale made monopoly in-
evitable. Bowman concludes that "considerable progress toward less monopoly (more com-
petition) can be achieved in the public interest without departing from Judge Hand's
'thrust upon it' rule." Ibid.
100. Adams, The Dilew'rna of Antitru.st Aims: A Reply, 42 AM. EcoN. Ray. 895 (1952).
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a long-run planning agency; relying on an antiquated system of cost account-
ing; with an inadequate knowledge of the costs or of the relative profitability
of the many thousands of items it sold; with production and cost standards
generally below those considered everyday practice in other industries; with
inadequate knowledge of its domestic markets and no clear appreciation of
its opportunities in foreign markets; with less efficient production facilities
than its rivals had; slow in introducing new processes and new products."101
On the basis of this powerful indictment, as well as other equally devastat-
ing evidence, some of our foremost economists concluded that the dissolution
of U.S. Steel into at least three separate integrated units would not violate
the demands of modern technology. They assured the Celler Committee:
"One can be opposed to economic bigness and in favor of technological big-
ness in most basic industries without inconsistency .... 1°-0
The experience under Section 11(b) of the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935 103 is also noteworthy. It indicates that the comprehensive
dissolution program under this Act did not preclude the optimum utilization
of modem technology nor precipitate the fatal loss of efficiency which had
been widely predicted prior to the law's passage. While the statistics are by
no means conclusive, they do show that in most cases efficiency increased
after dissolution, and that this increase was reflected in the security values
of those operating companies which were divorced from their parent organi-
zations. 0 4 While investors profited, consumers simultaneously benefited from
a decrease in utility rates which occurred despite rising operating costs and
higher taxes. This was eloquent testimony to the v.isdom and success of the
dissolution program in the utility field. Here certainly was an industry re-
quiring heavy capital investment, where a substantial amount of deconcen-
tration did not produce the decline in operating efficiency which management
spokesmen had expected and feared. While it is impossible to generalize on
limited evidence of this sort, it would appear, nevertheless, that before any
significant departures are authorized from traditional antitrust enforcement,
the advocates of workable competition shall have to establish the inexorable
link between giant size and industrial efficiency.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be well to remember that it is an antitriest law we
are concerned with. The Sherman Act, as a charter of economic freedom,
demands the promotion of more competition rather than the perpetual super-
vision of the policies and practices of monopoly. The Act is based on the
101. Testimony of Professor Stoddng. Hcarings before Sitbconnitlce on Study of
Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. IV-A
967 (1950). According to Professor Stocking, this vras an unpublished report by the engi-
neering firm of Ford, Bacon & Davis.
102. Id. at 996.
103. 49 STAT. 821 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1946). See Comment, Section 11(b)
of the Holding Company Act: Fifteen Years in Retrospect, 59 YALE L.J. 1023 (1930).
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theory that enforcement of competition "would contribute far more to the
public interest in the level of costs and prices and in the economic allocation
of capital than a programme of continuous surveillance of the business con-
duct of monopoly.' '105 In this sense, the Act is more than an instrument of
trade regulation; it is an expression of a uniquely American political phi-
losophy.
No one can deny that there are unresolved problems in applying the per se
doctrine of Section 1 and the market structure test of Section 2. It cannot
be argued, however, that the twin approach of workable competition and the
rule of reason is well calculated to resolve these problems in a manner con-
sistent with traditional antitrust objectives. The proposed approach fails to
provide an adequate guide for public policy and, more importantly, may lead
to the eventual marasmus of basic antitrust safeguards. In the final analysis,
the proposed approach stands for a proposition long ago diagnosed by Mr.
Dooley: "The trusts are hideous monsters. On the one hand, I would stamp
them under foot; on the other hand, not so fast."
104. Percentage Increase in Market Value of Common Stock of Certain
Public Utility Holding Companies between Date of Registration under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and September 24, 1951*
Percent of Increase from Registration Date to
September 24, 1951**
I
1. American Power & Light Co.
2. Columbia Gas System, Inc.
3. Commonwealth & Southern Cor
4. Electric Bond & Share Co.
5. Electric Power & Light Corp.
6. Engineers Public Service Co.
7. Middle West Corp.
8. National Power & Light Co.
9. Niagara Hudson Power Corp.
10. North American Co.
11. United Corp.
12. United Gas Improvement Co.
*Source: SEC, REPORT TO THE
Market Values Dow-Jones Dow-Jones
















SENATE SMALL BusINEss CommuTTEE: TuE PuDIac
UTILITIES HOLDING COMPANY AcT OF 1935 p. 21 (1952).
**The figures in these columns include the capital distributions of cash and portfolio or
holding-company securities, taken at closing prices as of September 24, 1951, made to the
holders of the common stocks of the holding companies listed herein.
***The figures for percentage increase in the Dow-Jones averages (in this and the next
column) are different for the different holding companies because the companies listed here
registered under the Act on different dates. No inter-company comparisons should, there-
fore, be made.
105. Rostow, supra note 59, at p. 6, col. 5.
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